The purpose of a logical framework such as LF is to provide a language for de ning logical systems suitable for use in a logic-independent proof development environment. All inferential activity in an object logic (in particular, proof search) is to be conducted in the logical framework via the representation of that logic in the framework. An important tool for controlling search in an object logic, the need for which is motivated by the di culty of reasoning about large and complex systems, is the use of structured theory presentations. In this paper a rudimentary language of structured theory presentations is presented, and the use of this structure in proof search for an arbitrary object logic is explored. The behaviour of structured theory presentations under representation in a logical framework is studied, focusing on the problem of \lifting" presentations from the object logic to the metalogic of the framework. The topic of imposing structure on logic presentations, so that logical systems may themselves be de ned in a modular fashion, is also brie y considered.
Introduction
In logic, the traditional way to present a theory is by giving a set of axioms. This is su cient for dealing with the simplest examples like groups or monoids. However, in Computer Science applications, such a presentation of a theory describing the behaviour of a complex real-life software system would involve a huge list of axioms, and the scale of such presentations makes them e ectively useless. A commonly-accepted way to cope with this problem is to impose structure on theory presentations BG77] and to build complex theories by combining smaller components. One advantage of such \modular" or \structured" theory presentations is that they provide a basis for guiding proof search in large theories. This was rst considered in SB83] in the context of Edinburgh LCF GMW79] . An LCF theory is presented by declaring base types, constants, and function symbols (i.e., by giving an LCF signature), and by giving a set of axioms over the language induced by these declarations. The fundamental idea in SB83] is to exploit the invariance of consequence under changes of signature described by \signature morphisms." The language of structured presentations considered there (and in this paper) uses signature morphisms to mediate the combination of theories and to provide a form of \information hiding." The primitives of the presentation language are su cient for the de nability of a variety of interesting constructions such as instantiation of parametric presentations. All this can be generalized to the context of logical systems other than LCF; the main purpose of this paper is to make this explicit and to consider the rami cations of these ideas in the context of a \universal metalogic" such as LF.
The Logical Framework (LF) HHP93] is a meta-language for de ning formal systems. It is a threelevel typed -calculus with -types, closely related to the AUTOMATH type theories dB80, vD80] . A formal system is speci ed by giving an LF signature, a nite list of constant declarations that speci es the syntax, judgement forms, and inference rules of the system. All of the syntactic apparatus of the formal system, including proofs, are represented as LF terms. The LF type system is su ciently expressive to capture the uniformities of a large class of logical systems of interest to Computer Science, including notions of schematic rules and proofs, derived rules of inference, and higher-order judgement forms expressing consequence and generality.
According to the methodology of HHP93, AHMP87], a necessary condition for the correctness of an encoding of an object logic L in LF is that the consequence relation`L of L be fully and faithfully embedded in the consequence relation`L F of LF by an encoding of the syntax of L as LF terms.
(The consequence relation of LF is given by considering type inhabitation assertions, as in NuPRL Con86].) By focusing on the embedding of consequence relations, LF may be viewed as a universal metalogic in which all inferential activity is to be conducted: object logics \exist" (for the purposes of implementation) only insofar as they are encodable in LF.
One important form of inferential activity in a logical system L is proof search: given a set of axioms or assumptions and a conjecture , determine whether or not `L . In keeping with the view of LF as a universal metalogic, proof in L is to be reduced to proof in LF via the encoding of L in LF. Numerous interesting questions arise in the process of carrying out this program. Pym Pym90] considers a variety of issues related to proof search, in particular the de nition of a uni cation algorithm and methods for conducting proof search in the context of an arbitrary LF signature. Elliott Ell89] has also developed a uni cation algorithm for LF, and Pfenning Pfe89], Pfe91] bases a logic programming language on it.
In this paper, we consider proof search in structured theory presentations. We focus on \lifting" structured presentations from the level of the object logic to the level of the metalogic, in particular, on the conditions under which proofs in the metalogic for lifted structured presentations soundly represent proofs for structured presentations in the object logic.
Another important aspect of LF is that it opens up the possibility of using several logical systems at once. For example, one may view the encoding of S4 modal logic given in AHMP87] as a combination of the truth and validity consequence relations of S4. In this paper we suggest some basic machinery of a language of structured logic presentations that allows for \putting together logics," just as structured theory presentations provide the machinery for \putting together theories." This machinery may be used to formalize examples such as adding a connective to a logic, or the parameterization of Hoare logic by the logic of assertions. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a general de nition of a logical system as a family of consequence relations indexed by signatures that satis es a certain uniformity condition with respect to change of signature. This resembles the formalization of a logical system as an institution from GB84a]; the crucial di erence is that institutions present a model-theoretic view of logical systems while the formulation in this paper is centered directly around the notion of a consequence relation. (See also FS87] .) The sorts of consequence relations that we consider are motivated by the strictures of encoding in LF, and thus are limited to one-sided consequence relations that are closed under weakening, permutation, contraction, and cut, and which satisfy compactness. In Section 3 we consider structured presentations in an arbitrary logical system. Structured presentations denote theories (sets of sentences closed under consequence), and the structure of the presentations induces a natural proof search procedure guided by this structure, which we discuss in Section 4. Generalizing the methodology of HHP93], in Section 5 we introduce the notion of a representation of one logical system in another, taking account of variability in signatures, and then consider the problem of \lift-ing" a structured presentation along a representation of one logical system in another. Structured presentations may not be simply translated via the representation and used in the target logic. Instead, we de ne a notion of proof that is conditioned by the representation, and give restrictions under which we may achieve the goal of working entirely within the metalogic. In Section 6 we introduce the metalogic of interest, LF, as a logical system, and de ne the notion of a logic presentation. A logic presentation is essentially an LF signature (with an indication of which terms encode the judgements of the object logic), together with a representation of the object logic in the logical system given by the presentation. In Section 7 we return to the problem of proof in structured theory presentations in the speci c setting of logics encoded in LF. In Section 8 we explore the colimit construction as a tool for building logics in a structured way; these ideas are more tentative than those in the rest of the paper. Finally, in Sections 9 and 10 we discuss related work and suggest directions for future research.
Consequence Relations and Logical Systems
Our treatment of logical systems centers on consequence relations (see Avr91] for a survey). We take a consequence relation to be a binary relation between nite subsets and elements of a set of \sentences" satisfying three conditions to be given below. We use and to range over sentences, to range over arbitrary sets of sentences, and to range over nite sets of sentences. We write ; 0 for union, and ; for f g; . If s : 1 ! 2 is a function, then the extension of s to subsets of 1 is denoted by s as well. Function application will often be denoted by concatenation, e.g., s stands for s( ).
De nition 2.1 A consequence relation (CR) is a pair (S;`) where S is a set of sentences and`
Fin(S) S is a binary relation such that The choice of conditions on consequence relations is motivated by our intention to consider encodings of logical systems in LF (in a sense to be made precise below.) By considering only nite sets of sentences, we implicitly restrict attention to compact consequence relations. Although the technical development does not depend in any way on this choice, only compact consequence relations are amenable to machine implementation.
The following apparently more general properties are easily seen to hold of any consequence relation: Proposition 2.2 1. If 2 , then ` . 2. If ` and ; ; 0` , then ; 0` . 3. If ` , then ; 0` . De nition 2.3 Let (S;`) be a consequence relation and let S 0 S. The restriction of (S;`) to S 0 , written (S;`) S 0 , is the consequence relation (S 0 ;`\ (Fin(S 0 ) S 0 )). Proposition 2.4 If (S;`) is a consequence relation and S 0 S, then (S;`) S 0 is indeed a consequence relation.
De nition 2.5 A consequence relation (S;`) induces a closure operation on sets of sentences S de ned by Cl`( ) = f j ` for some nite set g:
We usually write for Cl`( ) when`is clear from context. The containment is, in general, proper since the image of a theory under a CR morphism need not be a theory. However, it follows from the above proposition (by Proposition 2.6) that s( 1 ) = s( 1 ).
Techniques for structuring theory presentations are based on the idea of keeping explicit track of the language of a theory. Building large theories from smaller ones generally involves expansion of this language and/or change of the type/constant/function symbols used. Sometimes it is appropriate to \hide" some of the symbols in the language, restricting the vocabulary in order to abstract away from details of secondary interest. Consequently, a logical system is not viewed as being de ned over an arbitrary but xed language, but is instead considered to be a family of consequence relations indexed by a collection of signatures which determine the set of sentences considered. Variation in signature (for example, renaming constants or replacing constants by terms over another signature) gives rise to a natural translation of sentences over the signatures involved. Moreover, it is important that consequence be preserved under this translation. This partly captures the idea that the consequence relations in the family are de ned uniformly with respect to their signatures, and leads to the following de nition:
De nition 2.10 A logical system, or logic, is a functor L : Sig L ! CR. 1 The category Sig L is called the category of signatures of L, with objects denoted by and morphisms by : 1 ! 2 . A signature morphism : 1 ! 2 is to be thought of as specifying a \relative interpretation" of the language de ned by 1 into the language de ned by 2 . Writing L( ) = (jLj ;`L ), the de nition of logical system implies that if
The function L( ) underlying the CR morphism is called the translation function induced by . To simplify notation, we write ( ) for L( )( ) and ( ) for L( )( ) when no confusion is likely.
A logical system L has inclusions 2 i the objects of Sig L are pre-ordered by a distinguished subcategory of morphisms, which will be referred to as inclusions, and L maps signature inclusions to inclusions of consequence relations. Inclusions are designated by : 1 , ! 2 . In the particular cases that we study, signature morphisms are functions of some kind; we will normally assume without explicit mention that the signature inclusions are inclusions in the usual sense. The requirement that L preserve inclusions means that if : 1 , ! 2 and `L 1 , then `L 2 . If C is a category with a distinguished pre-order subcategory of inclusions, then we say that C has pushouts along inclusions i whenever f : A ! A 0 and : A , ! A 00 are morphisms of C, the pushout of f and exists, and, moreover, the morphism opposite the inclusion in the pushout diagram may be chosen to be an inclusion: Let = (S; ) be an algebraic signature. De ne the set Eq( ) of -equations to be the set of triples (X; t 1 ; t 2 ), where X is a nite sequence of mutually distinct variables decorated with elements of S and t 1 ; t 2 are -terms of the same sort with variables from X. The equation (X; t 1 ; t 2 ) will be written 8X: t 1 = t 2 , or t 1 = t 2 if X is the empty sequence. Equations with no variables will be called ground equations. The consequence relation (Eq( );`E Q ) is de ned in the standard model-theoretic way via a notion of satisfaction of a -equation by a -algebra, or equivalently by appropriate rules of equational deduction (re exivity, symmetry, etc. GM81]).
De nition 2.12 The functor EQ : Sig EQ ! CR is de ned by EQ( ) = (Eq( );`E Q ) EQ( : ! 0 ) = the usual extension of to a function Eq( ) ! Eq( 0 ) GEQ( ) is the restriction of EQ( ) to ground -equations, and GEQ( ) is the corresponding restriction of EQ( ). Proposition 2.13
1. EQ and GEQ are logical systems with inclusions. 2. Sig EQ has pushouts along inclusions (in fact, is co-complete). Proof EQ( : ! 0 ) is a CR morphism because of the Satisfaction Lemma BG80] . Similarly for GEQ. Pushouts in Sig EQ are de ned as in GB84b] .
In a similar manner we can present rst-order logic with equality. The logical system FOEQ has the same signatures as EQ (we take equality to be the only predicate) and for any many-sorted algebraic signature , FOEQ( ) is the set of closed rst-order logical formulae with equalities as atomic formulae, with the consequence relation induced by the usual inference rules (or equivalently by the usual satisfaction relation). For any signature morphism : ! 0 , FOEQ( ) translates closed -formulae to closed 0 -formulae in the obvious way. Then FOEQ is a logical system with inclusions.
Note that CR morphisms induced by signature morphisms in a logical system need not be conservative. Non-conservativity arises in EQ and FOEQ (due to the infamous empty carrier phenomenon | see GM81]) but not in GEQ.
Theory Presentations
Let L be an arbitrary logical system. As formulated above, L comprises a family of consequence relations satisfying some additional conditions. Thus, concepts introduced for consequence relations lift to L. Of particular importance is the concept of theory: De nition 3.1 An L-theory with signature is a set T jLj of sentences closed under`L .
Notice that in any given logical system, theories are classi ed by their signatures. Thus, for example, the equational theory of monoids and the equational theory of Abelian groups have di erent signatures although both are EQ-theories.
As mentioned in the introduction, the complexity of real-life software systems means that theories describing their behavior must be built in a modular or structured fashion. Only the simplest theories are presented in the traditional way by giving (a signature and) a set jLj of axioms, denoting the theory . We de ne below a rudimentary language of structured theory presentations for building more complex theories by combining and enriching such simple ones. The presentation language that we choose is adapted from SB83] for use in an arbitrary logical system. De nition 3.2 A structured theory presentation in L (L-presentation) is an expression in the language generated by the following grammar: P :: = ( ; ) j P 1 P 2 j translate P along j derive P via (Here is a Sig L -signature, is a Sig L -morphism and is a set of L-sentences.) Structured presentations of the form ( ; ) are called basic presentations. A structured presentation is nite if all the basic presentations it contains involve only nite sets of sentences.
In the above grammar we do not specify how signatures, signature morphisms, or sets of sentences are presented. For logics with nite signatures, it is unproblematic to de ne a presentation language for signatures and signature morphisms (e.g., Wir86]). In practice in nite presentations are given using some form of schematization. For the sake of simplicity we do not make this explicit here.
De nition 3.3 The signature Sg L (P) of an L-presentation P is de ned by induction on the structure of P as follows: Sg L (P) = i P = ( ; ), or P = P 1 P 2 and Sg L (P 1 ) = Sg L (P 2 ) = , or P = translate P 1 along , : 1 ! , and Sg L (P 1 ) = 1 , or P = derive P 1 via , : ! 1 , and Sg L (P 1 ) = 1 . P is well-formed i Sg L (P) is de ned. De nition 3.4 Let P be a well-formed L-presentation. The theory determined by P is de ned as follows:
is an L-theory with signature Sg L (P). Proof The non-trivial case is that of derive, where one has to notice that the co-image of a theory under a signature morphism is a theory.
The language of structured presentations allows large theories to be built in a exible and wellstructured fashion. Union is used to combine separate theories over the same signature. Theories over di erent signatures may be combined using union together with translate. If a signature in Sig L is thought of as a vocabulary of type, constant and function symbols, where a morphism is a renaming of the symbols in one signature to those in another, then the translate operation is useful for applying such a renaming to a theory while the derive operation is used to \abstract" from a theory by hiding some symbols (for example, auxiliary function symbols needed to nitely axiomatize some other function) and perhaps renaming the rest. The operations used are almost the same as those in SB83] (union is inessentially di erent). The theory-building operations of the speci cation language CLEAR BG80] may be de ned in terms of these primitives.
A Another example of the use of derive would be de ning a function sort by specifying auxiliary boolean-valued functions permutation and ordered, with the equations 8l:list: ordered(sort(l)) = true 8l:list: permutation(l; sort(l)) = true to de ne sort, and then using derive to hide permutation and ordered. In general, it is possible to give nite EQ-presentations using derive for theories which have no nite EQ-presentations without derive TWW82]. This is in contrast with the other theory-building operations; it is easy to see that any nite L-presentation built using only basic presentations, union and translate has the same theory as a nite basic presentation.
In general, we will say that two well-formed L-presentations with the same signature are equivalent if they determine the same theory. A more general situation is when we want to compare L-presentations with di erent signatures. This comparison is mediated by a morphism between the two signatures involved.
De nition 3.7 An L-presentation morphism :
ThPres L is the category of L-presentations and morphisms between them, with identities, composition, and inclusions inherited from Sig L .
Pushouts in the category of presentations may be used to de ne CLEAR-style instantiation of parameterized theories BG80], Ehr 82]. A presentation P is \parametric" in a presentation R if there is a ThPres L -inclusion : R , ! P. The idea is that R is a \requirement" speci cation for the theory P which may be regarded as taking any theory \matching" R as a parameter. The parametric presentation P may be instantiated by any presentation A provided that there is a \ tting morphism" : R ! A specifying how A is to be regarded as satisfying the requirements of R. :N: n + 0 = n; 8n; n 0 :N: n + succ(n 0 ) = succ(n + n 0 ); 8n:N: n 0 = 0; 8n; n 0 :N: n succ(n 0 ) = (n n 0 ) + ng (using + and as in x). Let Nat = ( Nat; EqNat) and let : Alphabet ! Nat be the presentation morphism de ned by (A) = N.
Then MonoidWithAlphabet(Nat ]) is the pushout of , . This is (a rough approximation of 3 ) the theory of sequences of natural numbers with types M and N, constants and 0 and functions , in, succ, + and . If type names such as sequence and nat and/or di erent constant and function names are required, these may be obtained using translate. To construct an instance of it, we now have to ensure that the parameter presentation matches Alphabet, which requires that it satis es the new requirements in Alphabet.
Add the following axioms to EqNat: 8n:N: 0 + n = n 8n; n 0 ; n 00 :N: n + (n 0 + n 00 ) = (n + n 0 ) + n 00 (these may be proved from the axioms already in EqNat if an appropriate induction principle is available). Then let : Alphabet ! Nat be de ned by (A) = N, (neutral) = 0 and (op) = + (this is a presentation morphism). Then MonoidWithAlphabet(Nat ]) is the pushout of , . This is the theory of sequences of natural numbers with a summation function (accum). In this example we have included the monoid axioms in the requirement theory Alphabet since these characterize the intended actual parameters. The axioms for accum may force elements of the type matching A to be identi ed if the function matching op is not associative or the constant matching neutral is not an identity for this function. Requiring the tting morphism to be a presentation morphism protects against such undesirable instantiations.
A variety of other constructions are de nable in ThPres L . For example, ThPres L has coproducts whenever Sig L does, and the theory of the coproduct is the disjoint union of the theories of the components. Colimits of more complex diagrams in ThPres L may be used to express sharing; such colimits exist if they exist in Sig L . In particular, diagrams in Sig L consisting only of inclusions arise in a natural way from the hierarchical construction of theories by extension. In many interesting cases all such diagrams have colimits, and we may therefore use colimits as the basis for a CLEAR-like or ML-like syntax for managing sharing ST85, ST86].
A parametric presentation amounts to a function which maps a presentation and a tting morphism to another presentation, with the result determined by the pushout construction. Another obvious mechanism for de ning such functions is -abstraction, and it would have been possible to use this here instead of pushout-style parameterization as above. In fact, one advantage of this alternative is that higher-order parameterization may be achieved without additional complications; see SW83], Wir86] and SST92].
Proof Search in Structured Presentations
For a basic L-presentation ( ; ), the consequence relation`L can be used directly to deduce consequences of , that is, sentences in Th L (( ; )). More generally, for an arbitrary presentation P, we would like to deduce sentences in Th L (P) from consequences of the component presentation(s) of P. To capture this, we will introduce judgements of the form P L , where is a Sg L (P)-sentence, and show how they can be proved.
De nition 4.1 We de ne a family of relations P L between well-formed L-presentations P with signature and sentences 2 jLj by induction on the structure of P as follows: 
Here, P L stands for P L for all 2 . Proposition 4.2 The relation P L Sg L (P) , where P is a well-formed L-presentation and is a Sg L (P)-sentence, holds i 2 Th L (P). Proof By structural induction on P, directly from De nition 4.1 and 3.4.
It should be obvious that De nition 4.1 embodies a proof system for entailment P L with rules like:
We can use this proof system as the basis for a proof procedure based on structured presentations.
To illustrate how such a proof procedure may take advantage of the structure of a presentation, consider a logical system L with inclusions. Let P 1 be an L-presentation with signature 1 , and let : 1 , ! be an inclusion. If 2 jLj 1 , then a useful heuristic for testing translate P 1 along L is to take 1 in the above proposition to be f g, and to test P 1 L 1 . According to De nition 4.1(3) this is su cient (but not necessary, in general), for since L preserves inclusions, 1 = f g, and hence the requirement 1`L is trivial. A generalization of this heuristic is embodied in the following rule: P 1
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Analogous rules arise from the other parts of De nition 4.1:
Proof in the context of a structured theory presentation is fundamentally di erent from proof in an ordinary (unstructured) theory presentation. Both kinds of presentations contain axioms which form the basic constituents of proofs. In the case of an ordinary theory presentation, we have a single set of axioms, and use of an axiom in a proof involves the application of the rule:
In contrast, the axioms of a structured theory presentation tend to be scattered throughout the structure. An axiom must be extracted from the basic presentation in which it resides when it is needed in a proof, using rules such as Translate. Proof in a structured theory can thus involve frequent changes of context, where proof fragments in the context of \small" theories correspond to the proofs of lemmas which are then brought to bear on the main proof via translation to the context of an appropriate \larger" theory. An analogy may perhaps be drawn with the use and discharge of assumptions in natural deduction proofs, where di erent parts of the proof of a theorem take place in the context of di erent sets of assumptions.
Given the goal of nding a proof for a theorem in a structured theory presentation P, where the proof may potentially involve axioms from a number of di erent subpresentations of P, there are two basic strategies which may be applied. Probably the most obvious of these involves reduction to the familiar case of proof in an unstructured presentation, using a technique referred to in SB83] as dredging. One proceeds by extracting (\dredging up") all of the possibly relevant axioms from subpresentations and translating these to theorems in P using inference rules such as Translate. These theorems may then be used in the proof of . This is the strategy which is (implicitly) used in systems with facilities for building new theories by combining and extending existing theories, such as Edinburgh LCF GMW79] (also Cambridge LCF Pau87] and Isabelle Pau92]), in which the new theory automatically contains all the axioms and theorems of its component theories. An alternative, called diving in SB83], is to translate to the context of an appropriate subpresentation P 0 of P, using rules such as Translate \backwards". If a proof for the translation of can be found in P 0 , then applying the same translation rules in the forward direction gives a proof of in P.
There are at least two problems with dredging. First, if P is large then dredging up all the axioms in P yields a large and unstructured set of axioms, many of which will (probably) make no contribution to the proof of . Second, dredging axioms from a structured presentation of the form derive P 0 via tends to lead to loss of information. For example, consider the following structured theory presentation based on the basic presentation Nat (over EQ) from Example 3.9: Nat = derive Nat via : Nat n f+g , ! Nat
The only axiom of Nat which can be directly translated to the context of Nat is 8n:N: n 0 = 0, since the remaining axioms of Nat involve the function + which is not available in Sg EQ (Nat ). Theorems of Nat such as succ(0) succ(0) = succ(0) are expressible in Sg EQ (Nat ), but there are in nitely many such consequences (and in EQ there is no nite way to present them all).
Likewise, diving by itself is not an appropriate strategy. For example, a proof of in a structured theory presentation of the form P 1 P 2 may involve the use of axioms from both P 1 and P 2 . A successful attempt to prove will involve either dredging up axioms from both P 1 and P 2 , or the formation of lemmas 1 and 2 such that P 1 L 1 , P 2 L 2 (establishing these may involve further diving) and 1 ; 2`L , or some combination of these. Similar problems can arise in structured presentations of the form translate P 0 along .
The most promising strategy for proving in P involves a mixture of diving and dredging. First, diving is used to focus on the smallest subpresentation P 0 of P containing all the information relevant to . This is the most appropriate context in which to attempt the proof; if P is a large structured presentation, such as the speci cation of a compiler, then in many cases P 0 will be very much smaller than P. Dredging may be used to extract axioms from P 0 , and the proof is then carried out using these axioms by employing the following rule:
Alternatively, a small set of lemmas may be formulated from which (the translated version of) can be proved (again using Cut to lift this proof to the level of structured presentations); each of these lemmas may then be proved in P 0 separately, perhaps by means of further diving and dredging. Lemma formation may be unavoidable if P 0 involves union or translate with nested subpresentations involving derive. The rst step of this strategy is to nd a subpresentation P 0 of P containing information relevant to the goal . The search for an appropriate P 0 is helped by the fact that translate forms an e ective barrier to diving \too deeply": given a presentation translate P 1 along : 1 ! and a -sentence , diving down to the level of P 1 will be impossible if is not expressible in the vocabulary which 1 provides, i.e. if there is no 1 2 jLj 1 such that L( )( 1 ) = . A common pattern is (translate P 1 along 1 ) (translate P 2 along 2 ), where the two uses of translate \guard" the branches of the union against inappropriate diving. Because translate has this e ect, in a well-structured theory presentation it is often possible to nd an approximately correct subpresentation P 0 by simple depthrst search. 8i; j:index; v:value; a:array: not(eq(i; j)) ) get(i; put(j; v; a)) = get(i; a) 8i:index: present(i; nilarray) = false 8i:index; v:value; a:array: present(i; put(i; v; a)) = true 8i; j:index; v:value; a:array: not(eq(i; j)) ) present(i; put(j; v; a)) = present(i; a)
Here, and 0 are the inclusions of Sg EQ (Index) and Sg EQ (Cond) respectively into Sg EQ (Index) Sg EQ (Cond), and b ) t = t 0 is an abbreviation for cond(b; t; t 0 ) = t 0 .
There is a ThPres EQ inclusion Item , ! Stack , and a ThPres EQ morphism : Item ! Array given by (item) = array. Expanding all the uses of enrich and the single use of application, we obtain a structured theory presentation containing eight basic presentations, seven uses of union, nine uses of translate and one use of derive. All of the signature morphisms involved are inclusions except for 0 (used in the nal derive step) and one which arises from the application of Stack to Array.
SymTab is expressible as a basic presentation so it is possible in principle to dredge up all the information it contains. In practice this would be di cult: most of the axioms in the subpresentations of SymTab are not directly expressible in the signature Sg EQ (SymTab), so dredging would lose information unless appropriate theorems which are expressible in that signature are rst formulated and proved in these subpresentations. Now, suppose that we wish to prove that SymTab EQ and it is possible to dive down to the level of Stack with this goal (using Union-left, Translate, Union-right), where this is found to be an axiom in the enrichment used to build Stack. The above procedure represents a successful LCF-style top-down goal-directed search for a proof of the original theorem; such a proof may now be obtained by applying the corresponding inference rules, proceeding bottom-up.
Logic Representations
The next issue to address is the sense in which one logical system can be represented or encoded in terms of another logical system. The essence of such a representation is a mapping from the sentences of the rst system to those of the second, in such a way that consequence is accurately preserved. Log is the category of logics and logic morphisms.
A morphism of logics is to be thought of as an \encoding" of one logical system in another in such a way that consequence is preserved. Let : L ! L 0 be a morphism of logics. 4 We use \;" to denote not only composition in a category (e.g., the usual composition of functions and functors) written in diagrammatic order, but also both vertical composition of natural transformations and the composition of a natural transformation with a functor so that ( CR 1 ; ( Sig 1 ; CR 2 )) = ( CR 1 ) ; ( CR 2 ) Sig 1 ( ) . If is a representation of L in L 0 , then we may use L 0 as an \inference engine" for L. We would like to consider how this interacts with the ideas in the previous section concerning proofs in structured theory presentations in L. The rst step is to use the proof system introduced in De nition 4.1, replacing all uses of `L by ( )`L 0 ( ) ( ). Then, the proof methodology discussed in the previous section need not make any use of L for elementary inference. The proof process is still, however, driven by an L-presentation P, and so involves the sentences, signatures and translations induced by signature morphisms of L. But if our goal is to reduce all inferential activity in L to inferential activity in L 0 , then we would like to \lift" P to an L 0 -presentation, and perform structured proof in L 0 guided by the lifted presentation. To make this precise, we rst de ne a natural lifting of presentations.
De nition 5.6 Suppose that : L ! L 0 is a representation, and let P be an L-presentation with signature . The representation of P in L 0 wrt is given by the following function de ned by induction on the structure of P:~ (( ; )) = ( Sig ( ); CR ( )) (P 1 P 2 ) =~ (P 1 ) ~ (P 2 ) (translate P 1 along ) = translate~ (P 1 ) along Sig ( ) (derive P 1 via ) = derive~ (P 1 ) via Sig ( )
Proof By straightforward induction on the structure of P. Let be the same signature with a removed, and let : , ! 0 be the corresponding signature inclusion. Let P 0 = ( 0 ; ;), P 1 = derive P 0 via and P = P 1 ( ; f8x:s: b = cg). The source of this failure of equivalence is a discrepancy between Th L (P) and Th L 0 (~ (P)). The use of the derive operation may cause the following crucial property to be lost:
(The reverse inclusion follows directly from Proposition 5.7.) In the counterexample, the sentence 9x:s: true is a witness to the failure of this containment, but is not, by itself, su cient to refute the conjecture, for it lies outside of the image of . The union operation used in the counterexample to construct P \exploits" this discrepancy to produce a sentence in the \lifted" theory that lies within the image of , and hence refutes the conjecture. The translate operation may be used instead of union to exploit the discrepancy created by derive in a similar manner. But neither union nor translate are able to create such a discrepancy. In fact, if an L-presentation P does not involve derive, then Th L 0 (~ (P)) = (Th L (P)).
Proposition 5.10 Consider an arbitrary representation : L ! L 0 .
1. Suppose ( ; ) is a well-formed basic L-presentation. Then Th L 2. Suppose P; P 0 are well-formed L-presentations with the same signature satisfying Th L 0 (~ (P)) = (Th L (P)) and Th L 0 (~ (P 0 )) = (Th L (P 0 )). Then Th L 0 (~ (P P 0 )) = (Th L (P P 0 )):
3. Suppose P is a well-formed L-presentation satisfying Th L 0 (~ (P)) = (Th L (P)) and : Sg L (P) ! . Then Th L 0 (~ (translate P along )) = (Th L (translate P along )):
4. Suppose P is a well-formed L-presentation satisfying Th L 0 (~ (P)) = (Th L (P)) and : ! Sg L (P). Then Th L 0 (~ (derive P via )) (Th L (derive P via )):
The inclusion may be proper. However, we have: ?1 (Th L 0 (~ (derive P via ))) = ?1 (Th L (derive P via )) (= Th L (derive P via )):
Since the most obvious approach fails as explained above, is there a sense in which we can lift structured presentations from L to L 0 ? The answer is given by considering an alternative de nition of the theory of an L-presentation that is conditioned by the representation . De nition 5.11 Let : L ! L 0 be a representation. For any well-formed L-presentation with signature , the L 0 -theory of P wrt , written 5 Th (P), is de ned as follows: Th (( ; )) = ( ) Th (P 1 P 2 ) = Th (P 1 ) Th (P 2 ) Th (translate P 1 along ) = ( )(Th (P 1 )) Th (derive P 1 via ) = (jLj ) \ ( ) ?1 (Th (P 1 )) Note that we are de ning the L 0 -theory of an L-presentation, conditioned by the representation of L in L 0 . This is because in the case of derive, the restriction to the range of makes reference to the L-signature of the L-presentation P. Although this restriction ensures that only L-sentence images are taken from P, the closure of the result under`L 0 admits non-L-sentence images into the result. In e ect, in the case of derive, only L-sentence images are admitted as intermediate lemmas, whereas arbitrary L 0 -sentences are admitted as consequences of these lemmas. This will be re ected in the proof search procedure associated with this de nition.
Theorem 5.12 If P is a well-formed L-presentation, then Th (P) is an L 0 -theory with signature (Sg L (P)) such that Th (P) = (Th L (P)). Proof By a straightforward induction on the structure of P. The only interesting case is that of derive; the others follow from Proposition 5.10. Suppose that P 1 is a well-formed L-presentation and : ! Sg L (P 1 ). Using the inductive hypothesis Th (P 1 ) = (Th L (P 1 )), we have to prove (jLj ) \ ( ) ?1 (Th (P 1 )) = ( ?1 (Th L (P 1 ))). : Take 0 2 (jLj )\ ( ) ?1 (Th (P 1 )). Then 0 = ( ), for some 2 jLj , and ( )( 0 ) 2 Th (P 1 ). By naturality of and by the inductive assumption, we have ( ( )) 2 (Th L (P 1 )), that is for : Take 0 2 ( ?1 (Th (P 1 )) ). Then 0 = ( ), for some 2 ?1 (Th L (P 1 )), that is ( ) 2 Th L (P 1 ). By the inductive assumption, ( ( )) 2 Th (P 1 ) and since by naturality of , ( )( ( )) = ( ( )), we conclude that 0 = ( ) 2 ( ( )) ?1 (Th (P 1 )), which completes the proof in this case since clearly 0 2 (jLj ).
As in the previous section, De nition 5.11 induces a corresponding entailment relation, between L-presentations P and L 0 -sentences 0 with signature (Sg L (P)). De nition 5.13 We de ne a family of relations P between well-formed L-presentations P with signature and sentences 0 2 jL 0 j ( ) by induction on the structure of P as follows: Here, P 0 stands for P 0 for all 0 2 0 .
Proposition 5.14 The relation P 0 , where P is a well-formed L-presentation with signature and 0 2 jL 0 j ( ) , holds i 0 2 Th (P). Proof By structural induction on P, directly from De nition 5.13 and 5.11.
Theorem 5.12 may be restated in terms of the entailment relations we have introduced.
Corollary 5.15 For any L-presentation P with signature and 2 jLj , P L i P ( ).
De nition 5.13 provides the basis for a proof procedure for L 0 sentences relative to an L-presentation. As we remarked above, we would like to achieve a complete reduction to L 0 by working with the representation~ (P) of P. The conditions under which we can achieve this may be derived by comparing the proof system determined by De nition 5.13 for P ( ) with that determined by De nition 4.1 for the case of~ (P) L 0 ( ) ( ).
First, if we restrict attention to L 0 -sentences 0 in the image of (i.e., such that there exists an L-sentence with 0 = ( )), then case (4) of De nition 5.13 may be simpli ed to derive P 1 via 0 i P 1 1 ( )( 0 ); since ( )( 0 ) = ( )( ( )) = ( ( )) (the last step by naturality), and so we can take 0 = f ( ) g, Note, however, that requiring surjectivity is a rather strong restriction. As we shall see below, in practical situations it is necessary to admit the use of L 0 -sentences lying outside of the range of as intermediate lemmas in the process of proving sentences lying within the range of . It is therefore important to admit arbitrary L 0 sentences as goals of the \lifted" proof procedure.
Second, although the proof procedure induced by De nition 5.13 is guided by an L-presentation P, it does not make direct use of any of the components of P, but rather only of their representations in L 0 . For example, in the case of translate, the procedure applies ( ), not (i.e., L 0 ( ( )), not L( )).
In a sense the proof procedure forms~ (P) \on the y," taking the representations of each component of P in order to carry out the proof. The essential di erence between an L 0 proof guided by~ (P) and the above P-guided proof procedure lies in the restriction on 0 in the case of derive. To enforce this restriction, the proof procedure must be able to decide, given and 0 2 jL 0 j ( ) , whether 0 = ( ) for some 2 jLj . Such a test requires only the signature of derive P via and the representation . But since is a representation, the component Sig is an embedding, and hence is determined by ( ). Therefore no L-entities are needed; it is enough to have the image ( ) of . We may therefore use~ (P) to guide the proof, provided that is a representation and we can test membership in the range of . To make this explicit, let us introduce yet another entailment relation.
De nition 5.17 Let L be a logical system, and let S be a family of sets S jLj for 2 Sig L . We de ne a family of relations P L;S between well-formed L-presentations P with signature and sentences 2 jLj by induction on the structure of P as follows: To assess the practical implications of the requirement to keep track of the image of and to check (in the case of derive) whether a sentence is in this image, we turn in the next section to the representation of logics in LF.
6 Logical Systems and LF We refer to HHP93] for a complete de nition of LF. A complete understanding of the detailed technicalities below requires a reasonable acquaintance with the intricacies of the LF type theory. However, we hope that the general ideas are intelligible even without such background. In order to discuss representations of logical systems in LF, we rst de ne the logical system associated with the LF type theory. The basic form of assertion in this logic is that a closed type is inhabited. The restriction to closed types is a simpli cation that su ces for the purposes of this paper, but would have to be relaxed in practice. (See Section 10 and HST89b] for further discussion.)
An LF signature consists of a sequence of declarations of constants and types (and type families). The former are written as c:A where A is the type of c, and the latter as c:Type ( is an inclusion, and hence is usually omitted.
The following proposition expresses the stability of the assertions of the LF type theory under change of signature, which is the crucial fact used to justify the well-formedness of the de nitions given throughout the rest of this section; detailed proofs are omitted. De nition 6.6 Let be an LF signature. The category of extensions of , written Sig LF , is the full subcategory of the slice category # Sig LF determined by the inclusions : , ! 0 . More explicitly, Sig LF has as objects pairs consisting of a signature 0 2 jSig LF j together with an inclusion : , ! 0 . In the following we will simply write : , ! 0 for objects of Sig LF . A morphism from 1 : , ! 1 to 2 : , ! 2 in Sig LF is a signature morphism : 1 ! 2 in Sig LF such that 1 ; = 2 . The identities and composition are inherited from Sig LF .
Every LF signature induces a logical system based on that signature as follows:
De nition 6.7 Let be an LF signature. The functor LF : Sig LF ! CR is de ned on objects by LF ( : , ! 0 ) = LF( 0 ) and on morphisms : 0 ! 00 (in the category of extensions of ) by LF ( ) = LF( ): Proposition 6.8 LF is a logical system with inclusions.
An encoding of a logical system L in LF comprises not only an LF signature L , but also an \internal type family" distinguishing the basic judgements of L in the encoding. De nition 6.11 Let ( ; J ) be a logic presentation. The logical system presented by ( ; J ), P( ; J ), is the restriction of LF to the range of J . Speci cally, P( ; J ) : Sig LF ! CR is de ned on objects by P( ; J )( : , ! 0 ) = LF( 0 ) Rng 0 (J ) and on morphisms : 0 ! 00 in the slice category by P( ; J )( ) = LF( ) Rng 0 (J ) (notice that since : , ! 0 is an inclusion, J is also an internal type family of 0 ). Proposition 6.12 P( ; J ) : Sig LF ! CR is indeed a logical system and has inclusions. De nition 6.13 A logical system is uniformly encodable (in LF) i there exists a logic presentation ( L ; J L ) and a surjective representation L : L ! P( L ; J L ). The triple ( L ; J L ; L ) is called a uniform encoding of L.
The word \uniform" re ects the fact that we require a \natural" encoding of the entire family of consequence relations of L in LF, rather than a signature-by-signature encoding as is suggested by the account in HHP93]. The requirement of surjectivity ensures that J accurately describes the images of L-sentences in LF. For example, in the encoding of rst-order logic in HHP93], all closed long normal forms of the shape true(M) represent rst-order sentences.
As an example of a uniform encoding, we consider the logical system EQ de ned in Section 2. The encoding of EQ will be given in Example 6.16 but for the bene t of readers unfamiliar with LF we will work our way up to this gradually, beginning with the single-sorted case. Thus single-sorted algebraic signatures are families of the form h n i n 0 where the type of individuals is left implicit and for n 0, n is the set of n-ary function symbols. Call this logical system EQ 1 . We begin with the even simpler case of single-sorted ground equational logic, GEQ 1 . Example 6.14 Let GEQ 1 be the LF signature : Type eq : ! ! Type re : x: : eq x x sym : x: : y: : eq x y ! eq y x trans : x: : y: : z: : eq x y ! eq y z ! eq x z cong : f: ! : x: : y: : eq x y ! eq(f x)(f y) and let J GEQ 1 = feqg. A uniform encoding of GEQ 1 is the triple ( GEQ 1 ; J GEQ 1 ; ) where : GEQ 1 ! P( GEQ 1 ; J GEQ 1 ) is a surjective representation de ned as follows:
For each single-sorted algebraic signature = h n i n 0 , Sig ( ) is the extension of GEQ 1 by the constant f : ! ! ! | {z } n times for each f 2 n . We assume that n does not contain eq, re , etc. for each n 0. Then Sig extends to a functor Sig : Sig GEQ 1 ! Sig LF GEQ 1 in the obvious way. There is an obvious bijection between the set of ground -terms and the set of closed LF terms of type in Sig ( ) and hence between ground -equations and the set of closed LF types of the form eq t t 0 in Sig ( ). This determines a surjective function : jGEQ 1 j ! Rng Sig ( ) (eq) which is natural in and which is a conservative CR morphism : GEQ 1 ( ) ! LF( Sig ( )) Rng Sig ( ) (eq). The sym : x: : y: : true(eq x y) ! true(eq y x) trans : x: : y: : z: : true(eq x y) ! true(eq y z) ! true(eq x z) cong : f: ! : : ! o: x: : y: : true(eq x y) ! true( (f x)) ! true( (f y)) and let J GEQ o 1 = f true g.
We have generalized the earlier congruence rule to allow predicates other than eq to be added without additional congruence rules. This is not necessary for the examples below in which we deal with logics having equality as the only atomic predicate. It may be shown that the rule cong above is equivalent (in the presence of re ) to the following two rules: : true(8 ) ! true( x) and let J EQ 1 = ftrueg. We can de ne a surjective representation : EQ 1 ! P( EQ 1 ; J EQ 1 ) similarly as in Example 6.14. This yields a uniform encoding ( EQ 1 ; J EQ 1 ; ) of EQ 1 .
Let be an algebraic signature with fa; bg 0 and ffg 1 . The following is derivable in LF:
ax1 :true(8( x: : eq(f x)a)); ax2:true(8( x: : eq(f x)b))` Sig ( ) ( y: : trans a (f y) b (sym (f y) a (8E ( x: : eq(f x)a) y ax1 )) (8E ( x: : eq(f x)b) y ax2 ) )a : true(eq a b) This represents a proof that 8x: f(x) = a; 8x: f(x) = b`E Q 1 a = b:
A careful analysis of examples like this one shows how the quanti er elimination and introduction rules together with LF's substitution mechanism simulate the substitution rule of equational logic, taking correct account of the possibility that the domain of quanti cation might be empty GM81].
The nal step is to add mechanisms to encode the possibility of having more than one sort of individuals to the above encoding of single-sorted equational logic. We add a type of sort names and we attach to each sort name the type of its values. Then, both the syntactic operations (eq and 8) and the inference rules must be supplied with a sort name as an additional parameter. A uniform encoding of EQ is the triple ( EQ; J EQ; ) where : EQ ! P( EQ; J EQ) is a surjective representation de ned as follows:
For each many-sorted algebraic signature = (S; ), Sig ( ) is the extension of EQ by the constant s : sorts for each s 2 S and the constant f : obj (s 1 ) ! ! obj (s n ) ! obj (s) for each f : s 1 s n ! s in . We assume that eq, re , etc. do not occur in . Then Sig extends to a functor Sig : Sig EQ ! Sig LF EQ in the obvious way. Notice that in EQ we cannot derive 8x : s 0 : f(x) = a; 8x : s 0 : f(x) = b`E Q a = b:
and correspondingly this cannot be derived in the LF encoding either: in the LF signature Sig ( ) and the context ax1 :true(8 s 0 ( x:obj s 0 : eq s (f x) a)); ax2:true(8 s 0 ( x:obj s 0 : eq s (f x) b)) there is no term of type true(eq s a b).
More complex examples may be built using the various representations of logical systems in LF presented in AHMP87].
Proof Search under Uniform Encodings
Let us now return to the problem of proof in structured theory presentations. Given a uniform encoding of a logical system L, we intend to exploit the proof mechanisms of LF to conduct proofs in structured L-presentations.
Since the representation part of a uniform encoding of a logic L is required to be surjective, it might be thought that we may use the na ve lifting of L-presentations to LF, relying on Corollary 5.16. But this is not the case, for in practice we work not in P( L ; J L ), but in LF( L ), which is to say that we cannot restrict attention to sentences in the range of J L only. For example, in the encoding of S4 AHMP87], sentences are represented by terms of the form true(M). But to prove, say, true( (M)), we must, in certain cases, prove valid(M). But this type lies outside of the image of (and cannot be soundly included in it). Now since P( ; J ) is de ned to be the restriction of LF to the range of J , there is an obvious \inclusion" of P( ; J ) into LF which is typically not surjective. However, the set of sentences considered is explicitly determined by J . Example 7.1 Recall the presentations given in Counterexample 5.9: 0 is the signature with sorts s and s 0 and constants a:s and b; c:s 0 , is the same signature with a removed, : , ! 0 is the inclusion, P 0 = ( 0 ; ;), P 1 = derive P 0 via and P = P 1 ( ; f8x:s: b = cg). Consider the uniform encoding ( EQ; J EQ; ) of EQ in LF given in Example 6.16. We will conduct inference in P via this encoding.
The LF signature ( 0 ) is the extension of EQ by constants s; s 0 :sorts, a:obj s and b; c:obj s 0 .
The following is derivable in LF:
t:Type` ( 0 ) ( f:obj s ! t: f a) : (obj s ! t) ! t Thus, in the inhabitation logic of LF, we have in particular 
Putting Together Logics
In this section we consider the adaptation of the idea of presenting theories in a structured way to logic presentations. As a rst step in this direction we investigate the use of pushouts to give an account of parameterization and instantiation of logic presentations. We have in mind such examples as: the parameterization of Peano arithmetic by the underlying predicate calculus, with instantiations like classical Peano arithmetic and Heyting arithmetic; the parameterization of Hoare logic by the logic of assertions; the parameterization of the calculus of synchronization trees by the synchronization algebra Win81]. (where 00 = ; 000 | since is a signature inclusion, it is always possible to present 00 in this way) and p( ; 00 )(c) = This extends to morphisms using the co-universal property of pushouts. 2 ) which is natural in 1 . This de nes P( ) CR : P( 1 ; J 1 ) . !P( ) Sig ; P( 2 ; J 2 ).
We propose to use colimits in the category of logic presentations to build logics in the same way as colimits were used in Section 3 to build theories. Although the category of logic presentations is not nitely co-complete, it may be shown that a diagram in LogPres has a colimit i its projection to Sig LF has a colimit. The most pertinent case is that of pushouts along inclusions: De nition 8.4 A logic presentation morphism : ( ; J ) , ! ( 0 ; J 0 ) is an inclusion if : , ! 0 is an inclusion and J J 0 .
Proposition 8.5 LogPres has pushouts along inclusions. Proof The pushout of : ( ; J ) ! ( 1 ; J 1 ) and : ( ; J ) , ! ( 2 ; J 2 ) is given by the object In the above examples we used pushouts in the category of logic presentations as a mechanism for instantiating parameterized logic presentations. The functor P allows us to view this as a combination of the corresponding logical systems. A more straightforward method would be to combine logical systems directly, using pushouts in Log. 6 In general, the result would be di erent (P is not nitely co-continuous). The reason for the di erence is that in Log the internal structure of sentences is not visible and so the combination is done in a coarse, super cial way. For example, consider two extensions of EQ 1 , one which adds negation (giving equations, negations of equations, negations of negations of equations, etc.) and another which adds conjunction (giving equations, conjunctions of equations, conjunctions of conjunctions of equations, etc.). The pushout of these in Log is a logical system with the union of the two sets of sentences but not including (for instance) conjunctions of negations of equations. This is in contrast to the result of taking the pushout of the obvious presentations of these logics in LogPres, in which the ne detail of the structure of sentences is visible. The resulting presentation has negation and conjunction built in as operations on the type o of formulae and hence the logical system it presents contains sentences with arbitrarily deep interleaving of conjunction and negation, as expected. The same phenomenon may be illustrated using Examples 8.6 and 8.7. As we have mentioned, UNIV(PROP(GEQ o 1 )) is a presentation of a version of rst-order logic. Performing the analogous construction at the level of logics, a much smaller set of sentences would be obtained; for example, the existential quantifer would not be expressible. Summing up, this suggests that the proper way to combine logics is at the level of logic presentations rather than at the level of the logics themselves.
The same problems of sharing mentioned in Section 3 with reference to building large theories arise when building complex logics (such as seem to be appropriate for reasoning about Standard ML programs ST91]). More complicated colimits are again applicable here, and as before the relevant diagrams arise in a natural way from the way that logics are combined using the notation of a language such as CLEAR BG80] . A di erence is that some diagrams in LogPres have no colimit, so it is useful to consider a subcategory (with inclusions) of LogPres in which all colimits exist. By proceeding in this way we obtain a CLEAR-like or ML-like language for de ning logics in a structured way.
Related Work
Our notion of a logical system is inspired by Goguen and Burstall's work on institutions GB84a] and by Fiadeiro and Sernadas's -institutions FS87]. Roughly speaking, institutions are a modeltheoretic view of logical systems based on signature-indexed families of satisfaction relations that are well-behaved under variation in signature. -institutions are a theory-based view of logical systems based on closure operations on sets of sentences, and are equivalent to our logical systems. We prefer to take consequence as basic both as a matter of taste and because this framework admits generalizations that are not available in -institutions (e.g., multi-conclusioned CR's, CR's based on multisets or sequences, rather than sets, and CR's that are not closed under weakening.)
Institutions were rst used to parameterize the semantics of CLEAR BG80] by the logical system used to write speci cations, an idea which has been pursued for other speci cation languages ST86], ST88a] and in connection with the foundations of formal program development BV85, ST88b], since then. The ideas in Sections 3 and 8 concerning building theories and logics in a structured fashion have their roots in CLEAR and are related to Goguen's earlier work on general systems theory Gog71].
ST88a] considers a language of structured speci cations which is similar to but richer than the language of structured presentations introduced in Section 3. As discussed in ST92], there is an essential di erence between the view of structured presentations purely as theory presentations, which we take here, and the view of them as speci cations as in ST88a]. The main role of speci cations is to describe the class of their admissible realizations (models), and hence the primary semantics of the speci cation language in ST88a] is given in terms of model classes. One way to construe the work in Sections 3 and 4 is as providing a sound proof-theoretic counterpart to this model-theoretic semantics. The proof search procedure presented in Section 4 is not complete for this semantics, at least in the case of logical systems such as EQ and FOEQ. But its advantage is that it strictly follows the structure of the presentation written by the user of the formalism, with bene ts such as those sketched in Section 4. Completeness seems to be the price we have to pay for this: the complete proof systems given in Far92] and Wir91] require the structure of the presentation to be altered in the course of proof.
In GB84a] a notion of institution morphism is presented, and used to investigate (among other things) the question of when a theorem prover for one logic can be used to prove theorems on theories from another. A morphism of logics in our sense corresponds roughly to a sound institution morphism in the framework of GB84a]. However, since the two kinds of morphisms are motivated by di erent concerns (an institution morphism indicates how one institution can be viewed as having been built over the other, while a logic morphism indicates how one logic can be encoded in the other), this comparison is not very accurate. Further work on providing a notion of morphism between institutions which adequately captures preservation of a proof-theoretic entailment relation associated with the model-theoretic satisfaction relation of an institution is presented in Mes89] and AC92].
In Tar86] it is shown that the category of institutions has limits and the idea of using limits to combine institutions is brie y discussed. Translating this to the present setting, these limits are related to colimits in the category Log of logical systems. In GB86] the concepts of charter and parchment are presented; these are progressively more primitive in that charters are used as tools for constructing institutions while parchments are in turn used to construct charters. A parchment for a logical system seems to correspond very roughly with an encoding of that logical system in LF, except that dependent types are not available in parchments. All such comparisons can only be vague since institutions, charters and parchments are fundamentally model-theoretic notions while our logical systems (and -institutions) are proof theoretic.
Like this paper, Gar92] attempts a careful explication of the concept of logic representation in LF which was not made fully formal in HHP93]. The main idea of the version of LF studied there is to re ne the type theory in such a way that it is possible to extract the logic de ned by a signature given only the signature. This is accomplished by distinguishing judgements from other types in the representing type theory, rather than using the \extra-logical" methods (the type family component of uniform encodings) that we have considered here. Our notion of uniform encoding corresponds roughly to the notion of adequate encoding in Gar92], although variation of signatures is not taken into account there.
Drawing on some of the ideas considered in this paper and on SW92], HP92] proposes a modules system for Elf, a logic programming language based on LF Pfe89], Pfe91]. This system provides structuring operations on LF signatures with which one may give structured presentations of logical systems and theories within a given logical system. An analogue of our presentation morphisms is provided via the notion of a realizor, which is essentially an interpretation of one signature in another given by a sequence of terms of the LF -calculus. The structuring operations considered in HP92] do not, by design, include an analogue of our derive operation. Proof search is provided by the solve primitive which not only attempts to determine if a given type is inhabited (i.e., whether the judgement it encodes is provable), but also computes an inhabiting term. The search procedure is conditioned by the using primitive with which the relevant portions of a structured logic presentation are marshalled for use by the solver. The absence of derive ensures that the problems with the behavior of the structured search procedure under representation (discussed in Section 5) are avoided.
Directions for Future Research
The de nition of logical system, and especially the de nition of uniform encoding, re ects the intention that sentences be \closed." The de nition of logical system and uniform encoding could be generalized to admit \open" sentences, but it is important to realize that there are (at least) two di erent ways to construe consequence in this situation Avr91]. Under the \truth" interpretation, free variables behave essentially as constants, and hence could be handled within our notion of logical system (the situation is more complicated in free logics such as PX HN88]). Under the \validity" interpretation, free variables are implicitly universally quanti ed at each formula. Hilbert-type presentations of rstorder logic usually take the validity interpretation, whereas natural deduction presentations take the truth interpretation. Some ideas on how the notion of logical system may be extended to accommodate free variables are in HST89b]. The de nition of basic theory presentation admits the possibility of an in nite set of axioms. In practice such sets are presented schematically since theories of interest are recursively presentable. The notion of logical system can be extended to treat axiom schemes explicitly, and the de nition of uniform encoding can be correspondingly generalized to encode schemes using -types. This extension becomes important in the case of certain truth-type logical systems lacking a universal quanti er, for there it is not possible to think of an axiom scheme as standing for all of its instances. It would be interesting to work out a treatment of schematization for both truth-type and validity-type logical systems.
The emphasis in this paper has been on provability, rather than on nding proofs. This is re ected in our decision to view logical systems as consequence relations, and in the concomitant de nition of search in structured presentations. It would be interesting to develop a general notion of logical system that includes an explicit representation of proofs. With this in mind, we have considered a categorical generalization of the notion of consequence relation whereby proofs become morphisms in a consequence category satisfying some weak closure properties (as in linear categories GL87]). It seems di cult, however, to develop the notions of structured presentation and structured search in such a way that a witness to the fact that a sentence is a consequence of a structured presentation may be extracted. The di culty seems to lie in the fact that structured presentations rely on working simultaneously with a family of consequence relations, rather than just one. When generalized to admit proofs, this means that we must consider a hybrid notion of proof that spans a family of consequence categories.
The CLEAR-style parameterization methods outlined in Section 3 require that a signature morphism be a presentation morphism. This is, in general, an in nitary proof obligation, and so cannot be considered as an instance of proof within the (encoding of) the logical system at hand. However, in many commonly-arising situations (in particular, in typical applications of parameterization), it must be shown that : P ! P 0 is a presentation morphism where P = ( ; ) is a nite basic presentation. This reduces to showing that P 0 , and hence is an instance of structured search, as explored in HP92] for presentations without the derive operation. But for general P the proof obligations are not \internalizable" in this way. Finding a fully satisfactory answer to this question is the subject of ongoing research; see Wir91], Far92] for proposed solutions and relevant discussion.
It is useful to consider a notion of uniform encoding that is not based on treating LF as a logical system. The idea is to regard basic theory presentations as contexts (more or less as now), and to \internalize" the presentation-structuring operations in an extension of the LF type theory. In particular, the derive operation seems closely related to existential types MP85]. Part of this program, for the fragment of the language without derive, is carried out in HP92].
A related idea is to view the presentation-structuring operations as \internal" logical operations, and to explore the analogy with (higher-order) categorical logic. In this way we hope to obtain a better proof theory for both deriving consequences of structured presentations and deriving entailments between such presentations HT92]. This would provide a simple way to represent proofs in structured presentations (since these would just be proofs in this richer logic) and to prove that a signature morphism is a presentation morphism (since this would reduce to an entailment between structured presentations). As mentioned earlier, such a proof system would necessarily involve altering the structure of presentations in the course of proof; this would be captured by rules allowing commutation of translate with derive (corresponding to the Beck condition) and of union with derive (Frobenius reciprocity), much in the style of the proof systems in Wir91] and Far92].
Finally, the language of structured presentations may be generalized to admit translation and inverse image along logic morphisms. This would allow for the combination of theories from several di erent logical systems, giving rise to an \inter-logic" search space similar to the \intra-logic" search space given by structured theory presentations. It would be interesting to develop these ideas further, and to consider their application to formal program development where there is some indication that such hybrid logics and inter-logic search will be of some use ST88b].
